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XXX and we seek the same thing – clinical relationships in which clinicians are 
sensitive to the needs of the specific clinical context, the specific patient, and the 
specific moment in that patient’s trajectory of care. But we have different views of the 
potential value of the evidence and theory in our review for clinicians wanting to learn 
how to achieve this sensitivity. Our reading of XXX’s letter suggests three potential 
reasons for this divergence.  
 
The first concerns contextual specificity. Our review focused on cancer care, but 
XXX seem not to. The paper that XXX cite to refute our findings that many people in 
acute cancer care prefer to avoid emotional talk in consultations does not provide the 
evidence that XXX claim, but does offer valuable clinical guidance1. One of its 
helpful suggestions is the value of doctors being primed to assess individual patients’ 
needs around decision-making by first being aware of those of patients in general. 
That paper suggests, not that doctors generalize from this evidence to all patients they 
see, but that they use it as the starting point for enquiring about what specific patients 
might need. In that vein, our paper aimed to point clinicians and educators in cancer 
care to starting points that are closer to how most cancer patients see the consultation 
than are those provided by the current paradigm. However, XXX do not address what 
may be special about cancer and seem to see no benefit from ideas about how the 
immediate threat of mortality affects what patients need from clinical relationships. 
While they teach clinicians to be ‘flexible’ in communication, the body of knowledge 
and theory on which they call for this is generic. It offers little to inform flexibility 
because it does not distinguish whether patients seek minor elective surgery at leisure, 
potentially life-saving surgery in an acute crisis, or care at the end of life2. 
 
The second source of divergence concerns the role of theory. Attachment theory is 
over half a century old, researchers have been applying it to health care relationships 
for much of this time and there have been suggestions, long predating ours, that it 
could inform teaching for clinicians about the psychological processes that underpin 
clinical relationships3. Nevertheless, the latest edition of the textbook they cite 
contains no reference to attachment or other theories for understanding close or 
dependent human relationships. Similarly, whereas medical ethicists have long 
explored ideas about clinicians’ goal-directedness4, readers wondering how to engage 
with the communication and ethical dilemmas surrounding clinicians’ multiple, 
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shifting, contextual and sometimes conflicting communication goals in cancer care 
might be disappointed by that textbook’s brief account of generic and universal 
goals2. For XXX, it seems that the current paradigm is sufficient; clinical 
communication in cancer care is one area of clinical medicine that has nothing to gain 
by looking beyond its current conceptual borders. We agree that expert teachers are as 
sophisticated as XXX describe, and we anticipate that many will have very insightful 
ideas, informed by their experience, about how issues in our review might be 
addressed in practice. However, not all are so expert or yet so experienced that they 
need no guidance from communication theory. And even experts need to engage with 
theory if they want their practice to be scientific rather than a ‘craft’ or ‘trade’. While 
rejecting our ideas, XXX seek support to expand the footprint of current educational 
practice. Arguably, if our discipline is to command the respect that this expansion will 
require from health professions and organisations, it will need to show the maturity of 
other specialties in being open to new thinking. 
 
The third reason for divergence with XXX may be that we look at evidence 
differently. XXX say we were biased, which is an inevitable aspect of critical reviews 
that we explicitly acknowledged. But they overlook the contribution of such reviews. 
They dismiss ours as ‘based primarily on [our] own qualitative studies’, whereas we 
refer to over 40 qualitative papers, only 11 of which we authored (and we make no 
apologies for having done a lot of research in this field). From our perspective, a 
crucial strength of qualitative work is that there is no hiding behind numbers. The 
reader cannot escape the fact that participants said what they did. So our review shows 
that, when different qualitative researchers approach cancer patients in different 
tumour groups, in different countries, many of these patients say things that are hard 
to reconcile with current thinking in clinical communication. Despite claims to 
‘patient-centredness’, XXX seem not to think we might learn from those voices – or, 
indeed, from the views of clinicians in some of those studies. Another contribution of 
qualitative work is to expose concepts that, while ‘taken for granted’ in large-N 
surveys, become more complex or confusing at the level of individual patients. For 
instance, while XXX cite survey evidence that patients prefer ‘shared’ decisions5, this 
information is uninformative for practice because, as our review points out, qualitative 
evidence shows that diverse kinds of clinician communication allow patients to feel 
involved in decisions – even when they want their clinicians to make those decisions.  
4 
 
 
We and XXX also look differently at quantitative evidence in this field. XXX cite two 
trials on communication skills training as support for the status quo6, 7. It is puzzling 
that these are so widely cited in this way because their design and statistical analysis 
fall short of current standards for clinical trials and preclude confident conclusions. 
Neither specified a primary outcome, instead attaching this status to a basket of 
clinician behaviours. One originally reported improvement in only half of these 
behaviours8; the 12-month follow-up then claimed maintained gains but without the 
non-inferiority analysis necessary to show this confidently6. The other trial found no 
significant improvement across 10 behaviours (and one significant deterioration) 
despite discussing the training as if it had succeeded7. Moreover, crucially, neither of 
the reports that XXX cited reported whether patients benefited, relying on 
measurement of clinician behaviours that the research teams had designated as 
desirable – despite the failure of systematic reviews to find clear evidence that 
patients benefit when communication skills training increases the frequency of such 
behaviours9. Crucially, neither trial specified what frequency of the target behaviours 
was sought; without a target other than ‘more’, the scientific status of such papers is 
weak because readers can never know when the desired outcome has been achieved. 
Given these limitations, our interpretation is that that the generous way in which such 
weak or ambiguous evidence is often read and cited illustrates the self-maintaining 
nature of the current paradigm. 
 
Our experience is that it is difficult to challenge dominant thinking in clinical 
communication without being perceived as critical of the career and practice of people 
who have worked hard to build communication research and teaching. The EACH 
presidential address which XXX cite seeks better links between educators, researchers 
and clinicians10. We offered our review in this spirit. The potential of such links will 
not be realized unless all parties engage with the challenges that ensue when people 
converge from different perspectives onto something as complex as clinical 
communication. 
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